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Tr a n s i t i o n  i n  A f g h a n i s t a n  t h r o u g h 
a n  E n d u r i n g  A f g h a n  N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y  F o r c e
Resumo
A Transição no Afeganistão Através de uma 
Força Nacional Afegã de Segurança
Quando em Novembro de 2009 foi criada a NATO 
Training Mission – Afghanistan, os programas de 
treino de forças de segurança afegãs eram díspa‑
res não existindo planos com vista a uma ade‑
quada transferência de competências para a 
Afghan National Security Force até 2014. Na ver‑
dade, o enfoque baseava ‑se na intenção de inver‑
ter tendências negativas no plano da segurança 
nacional e na formação de militares e polícias em 
quantidade necessária à condução de operações 
de contra ‑subversão. Qualidade e quantidade 
eram dois princípios não co ‑pagináveis – ou se 
criava uma força profissional pequena ou uma 
força grande com capacidades limitadas resul‑
tantes de um treino igualmente limitado. No 
entanto, dada a dimensão geográfica do Afega‑
nistão e a necessidade do Exército e da Polícia 
em garantirem a segurança e a estabilidade no 
país, a qualidade não podia ser comprometida 
em nome da quantidade.
Consequentemente, a NATO Training Mission – 
Afghanistan conduziu um processo deliberado de 
formação e treino de uma força profissional, 
auto ‑sustentável e duradoura. O progresso regis‑
tado nos últimos dois anos requereu um empenho 
e investimento significativo por parte dos Estados 
Unidos, da NATO e de outros países da coligação. 
Através de uma parceria, as forças de segurança 
afegãs estão a caminho de assumirem responsa‑
bilidades de segurança que competiam até agora 
à NATO.
Abstract
At the time NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan 
stood up in November 2009, security training 
programs were disparate and there were no plans to 
transition security lead to the Afghan National 
Security Force by 2014. Instead, the focus was simply 
on reversing the negative growth trends and 
producing soldiers and police to meet a quantitative 
goal for counterinsurgency operations. Quality and 
quantity were then seen as two mutually exclusive 
principles – you could either produce a small, 
professional force or a large force with limited 
training, but not both. However, given the size of 
Afghanistan and the necessity of the Army and Police 
to provide security and stability, quality could not 
be compromised for the sake of growth. Consequently, 
NATO Training Mission ‑Afghanistan embarked on 
a deliberate process to produce a professional force 
that is self ‑sustaining and enduring. Progress over 
the past two years has required significant investment 
from the United States, NATO and other coalition 
countries. Through partnership, the Afghan security 
forces are on a path to assume security lead from 
NATO.
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Ten years ago, Afghanistan was politically fractured, economically irrelevant, 
and socially repressive.1 The Taliban government, recognized by only three countries 
at the time, reduced the nation’s GdP per capita to under $170, almost completely 
destroyed public infrastructure, and ruptured Afghanistan into a conglomeration 
of belligerent localities, geographically isolated from one another. With just a few 
years in power, the Taliban furthered the regression of Afghan society increasing 
insecurity and fear. Through the Taliban’s alliance with al -Qa’ida, we soon learned 
what the 2011 national Military Strategy of the United States later underscored, 
“in this interdependent world, the enduring interests of the United States are in-
creasingly tied to those of other state and non -state actors” (chairman of the Joint 
chiefs of Staff , 2011). 
While Taliban totalitarianism attempted to destroy Afghans’ future, the interna-
tional community has begun to reverse the devastation of decades of war. Afghanistan 
still has many challenges, but it is also not the fragmented society it once was either. 
insurgent groups still conduct attacks, primarily in the south and east, but much has 
changed in ten years – Afghanistan is now sovereign, the international community 
is heavily invested in the future of Afghanistan, and society is slowly recovering. 
GdP has increased to $1,000 per capita, almost all Afghans have access to basic health 
services (only nine percent did in 2002), school enrollment increased from 900,000 
(mainly boys) to almost seven million (37 percent girls), women serve in government. 
Most of the country is now connected via mobile phones, highways, and common 
purpose – assume responsibility for its own security, governance, and development. 
To be sure, progress is dependent on international support for Afghanistan, but 
as agreed at the nATO summit in Lisbon in fall 2010, Kabul will increasingly as-
sume lead responsibility for its development and security. This process started in 
July 2011 when the first seven areas began to transition security responsibility from 
nATO to Afghanistan. The geographic transition process will continue until de-
cember 2014 when Afghan forces assume lead responsibility for security for the 
Afghan people. Far from signaling international withdrawal, over the next several 
years and beyond 2014, nATO forces will shift from combat operations to training, 
advising, and assisting the Afghan Army, Air Force, and Police. By rebuilding the 
Afghan forces into a professional military and police, Afghanistan will have the 
tools to provide security and stability for its people and the region. As the Minister 
of defense told the men and women of nTM -A on July 4, 2011, Afghanistan can 
and will be a contributor to international security some day.
 1 Parts of this essay appeared as “Beyond the Tenth Year: Building Partnership capacity and 
international Security,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E -Note, September 2011 and “Return on 
investment,” Armed Forces Journal, August 2011. 
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Rebuilding the Security Force
What was true generally for Afghanistan during the past 30 years was particu-
larly true within the Afghan Army, Air Force, and Police. The post -9/11 Afghan 
military and police inherited a hodgepodge of Soviet and Western equipment, 
doctrine, and training. exacerbated by decades of war, limited resources, and dis-
parate international programs to rebuild security, history took its toll on the mili-
tary and police. Attrition, illiteracy, and corruption negatively impacted force de-
velopment, effectiveness, and undermined the bonds between security forces and 
the Afghan people. This view was widely known and continues to influence per-
ception of the Afghan military and police.
in 2009, the force was underpaid, untrained, poorly equipped, illiterate, and 
poorly -led. At 97,000, the Afghan Army could not confront Taliban resurgence, 
which precipitated a surge of coalition combat forces in 2010. The 94,000 Afghan 
police were in an equally poor state; patrolmen earned less than half that of a 
soldier and used their positions to extort funds to ensure they had a living wage. 
in spite of these challenges, nATO committed to grow the force and rebuild the 
Afghan Army, Air Force, and Police into a professional force loyal to the Afghan 
people. These efforts would take place under the aegis of the iSAF surge, which 
would provide the time and space to build indigenous forces. Accompanying the 
iSAF surge was a surge of resources to support the training mission, which had 
suffered from a culture of poverty prior to 2009. in 2009, for example, there were 
just 30 nATO trainers. By the end of 2011, there will be about 1,800 nATO trainers. 
Financial resources also surged from $2.8 billion in Fiscal Year 2008 to $11.6 billion 
in Fiscal Year 2011. As infrastructure builds taper off, the annual budget will fall 
substantially to cover sustainment costs currently estimated at $6 billion a year.
Since fall 2009, international efforts have focused on growing the Afghan mili-
tary and police to meet the immediate needs of the security deficit in Afghanistan. 
The Afghan military went from negative growth of 1,200 soldiers in September 2009 
to adding more than 6,000 per month since 2010. Where there was once a dispara-
te Army of 97,000, a unified and ethnically -balanced force of 171,600 stands today. 
during the same period, the police grew from 94,000 to 135,000. The growth is not 
only a testament to the strength of partnership between the international commu-
nity and the government of Afghanistan, but also Afghans willingness to heed the 
call to defend their country and determine their future. U.S. Senator carl Levin 
welcomed this. “For years, i have strongly and repeatedly advocated for building 
up Afghan military capability because i believe only the Afghans can truly secure 
their nation’s future” (Levin, 2011).
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What Senator Levin notes is embraced in Afghanistan. Former Minister of in-
terior Ali Jalali wrote in Prism in September 2010, “The key to future success is a 
shared vision for the endstate in Afghanistan, and the building of indigenous ca-
pacity to achieve this goal.” (Jalali, 2010) or former Afghan presidential candidate 
and President Karzai’s Transition coordinator dr. Ashraf Ghani wrote in the same 
issue of Prism, “The success of the counteroffensive will be judged by its role in 
the larger project of counterinsurgency – creating the enabling environment for a 
stable political and economic system that can turn both Afghan citizens and regio-
nal players into stakeholders in its success” (Ghani, 2010). Building a capable Afghan 
Army, Air Force, and Police enables geographic transition, which realizes Afghans’ 
goals for a sovereign country with the capabilities to control its borders, protects 
its people, and respond to man -made or natural disasters. Afghan army comman-
der for northern Afghanistan Zulmai Weesa made this point when Mazer e -Sharif 
began the geographic transition process in July 2011: “This is the start of a process. 
i will make sure that our sons and brothers will fulfill their duty to take over all 
security responsibility that is now on our shoulders” (Hakar, 2011). 
An underappreciated fact is that this is the Afghans’ war. every day, Afghan 
soldiers and police are conducting patrols in Helmand, interdicting insurgents in 
Paktika, and recovering weapons caches in Khost. iSAF forces are essential to the-
se efforts today, but it is with Afghans that combined operations protect the popu-
lation, build institutions, and deprive insurgents the support they need. Unlike 
iSAF forces, Afghan forces know the languages, cultural traditions, and geography 
where they patrol. Once properly trained, equipped, fielded, and partnered, Afghan 
soldiers and police can protect the population and support local governance and 
economic development. With growth and professionalization on track, efforts are 
underway to make the Afghan military and police independent and sustainable as 
iSAF forces transition lead responsibility for security.
Beyond Growth
Over the next two years, the Afghan Army, Air Force, and Afghan national 
Police will continue to grow from 305,000 and reach their combined authorized end 
strength of 352,000. At the same time, Afghan infantry kandaks (battalions) replace 
iSAF combat forces, the Afghan force will also develop the critical enabling and 
supporting capabilities to ensure sustainability. With its own logistic capability, the 
army can deliver supplies to forward deployed units. With its own explosive ordi-
nance disposal units, the army can remove mines left from the Soviet era or im-
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provised explosive devices left by insurgents; and with its own air force, Afghanis-
tan will have the capability to support its forces in the field or assist with regional 
disaster relief operations. 
Afghan police are making progress too. initially saddled by disparate training 
programs and lacking civilian police trainers and advisors, the Afghan national 
Police did not grow as easily as the Army did. Prior to 2009, police recruits were 
assigned as patrolmen without any training. Being untrained and poorly equipped 
made them vulnerable to attack by insurgents. Being poorly led and underpaid led 
them to prey on the population. Through unified international assistance, these 
trends are slowly being reversed and the Afghan police are learning what it means 
to serve and protect the population. Key to this is introducing civil policing; the 
Ministry of interior recently revised its training program to develop an Afghan 
curriculum based on best practices from the european Union Police, German Poli-
ce Project Team, nATO countries, and non -nATO countries. The curriculum ad-
vances Afghan civil policing through various topics such as: criminal investigation 
fundamentals, human rights, and gender issues. That training was extended from 
six to eight weeks during a time of war is a positive sign that the Ministry of in-
terior has budgeted the time and values the additional two weeks. The impact of 
better training, better equipment, better pay, and better leaders will be apparent 
over time.
in addition to the immediate needs of training, equipping, fielding, and part-
nering with Afghan forces for counterinsurgency operations, it is also essential to 
build enduring institutions and self -sustaining systems. This was obvious as we 
reviewed the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and visited nATO and Afghan units 
throughout Afghanistan. The lack of sustainment capabilities was evident in the 
ubiquitous derelict buildings and abandoned armored vehicles that cover the Afghan 
countryside. The lack of a logistics system hampered military operations and un-
dercut unit morale. Regular reports from think tanks and international organizations 
highlighted challenges like these, yet the international community committed to 
building the security capacity for Afghanistan and developing institutions to ensu-
re the force could endure beyond 2014.
The progress of these efforts and growing confidence in their forces are evident 
in our daily activities with Afghan policymakers, military, and police leaders. For 
example, commando Brigadier General Lawang (2011) said:
“My message to Afghan Commandos and Special Forces is we are Afghan, we are Muslim and 
sons of this country, we should fight bravely with honor and show professionalism in our work 
and conduct ourselves, do our duty with honor and integrity, if it is during the day or night 
time we should prove it to our people, that we can defend our country’s security and defend our 
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motherland. My message to our people is please send their sons and brothers to ranks of the ANA 
and Commandos to make this force stronger so we will be able to fight against the international 
terrorism and the enemy of our country and our religion”.
Minister of interior Mohammadi agrees, he told the Afghan national Police 
Symposium in January, “To win the support and confidence of the people and 
provide for the personal security of the citizens, we are determined to concentrate 
more on developing civilian policing capacities of the AnP” (Reveron, 2011). 
Similar efforts are underway within the Army and Minister of defense Wardak 
sees having a professional force “To take over our security and defend our country” 
(caldwell, 2011a). And President Karzai told an audience at the March national 
Military Academy of Afghanistan graduation, “We understand that the people of 
Afghanistan no longer want to see others defend for them… The transition is the 
answer to the long held aspirations of the people of Afghanistan” (caldwell, 2011b). 
For this to occur, recruited forces need to be trained, equipped, fielded, and par-
tnered.
Recruit and Train
While nATO countries value training for their own militaries and police, it was 
surprisingly disparate or absent prior to 2010. Afghan national Police, for example, 
were recruited and then assigned with the intent to train later. The ill -effects of 
assigning untrained, underpaid, and poorly -led patrolmen were evident in Afghan 
and international perceptions of the police. Simply, those assigned to protect used 
their authority to prey on the people they were supposed to defend. While nega-
tive perceptions still exist, there has been substantial progress and improvements 
in the training base. 
every day, more than 32,000 Afghan personnel are in training at 70 sites across 
21 provinces in Afghanistan, and in selected courses in the United Arab emirates 
and Turkey. The results are evident. in just two short years, the Afghan national 
Army went from using Soviet -era equipment to more modern nATO weapons. 
Weapons qualifications rates increased dramatically and Afghans learned to conduct 
convoy operations. Soldiers once unable to count or read are now enrolled in man-
datory literacy training. Within the Afghan national Police, patrolmen are not only 
enrolled in literacy training, but have a career track through leadership development 
opportunities at a non -commissioned officer course, an officer candidate school, 
and the Afghan national Security University.
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Literacy has become the essential enabler for supporting Afghanistan to grow 
its security forces. Those eligible for military and police service had their educations 
stolen by decades of war. entry -level testing shows that only about 14 percent of 
the new police and army recruits are functionally literate. To make up for the shor-
tfall, all illiterate Afghan soldiers and police recruits are enrolled in literacy pro-
grams to ensure they reach the international standard for literacy. currently, about 
3,000 Afghan teachers are following Afghan Ministry of education guidelines to 
help recruits overcome the illiteracy barrier. As of September 2011, over 150,000 
have received literacy training and the literacy rate within the security forces is on 
a path to be twice that of the population in 2012. 
Literacy training has become a major component of the lives of Soldiers and 
Police officers. now mandatory in Basic Warrior Training for the Afghan national 
Army and Basic Police Training for the Afghan national Police, literacy is the buil-
ding block for professionalizing the force. Literate soldiers and police can now 
account for the gear they are issued, know that they are receiving their full pay, 
and inspire their families to study. Literate soldiers can verify security credentials 
at base entry control points. numerate police can be on the lookout for stolen 
vehicles. For just $33 per person, the literacy program gives the “lost generation” 
opportunities for further training and professionalization.
Professionalize and Sustain
Professionalism is a defining characteristic of any effective military or police 
organization. While manning and equipping the army, air force, and police are 
important, it is the quality of the force that is critical. Although it is relatively easy 
to train a new Soldier or Patrolman, it takes much more time and effort to train, 
educate, and develop leaders. Leader development in the institutions and force 
development in the systems are all elements of a professionalized Afghan national 
Security Force that will help to close the credibility gap between the Afghan na-
tional Security Force and the Afghan people. This is all the more important consi-
dering that in many cases, Soldiers and Police provide the only connection betwe-
en the people and their central government. 
institutions such as the national Military Academy of Afghanistan, the combi-
ned Sergeants Major course, the Police Academy, and ncO leader development 
courses will soon be unified as part of a broader institution call the Afghan natio-
nal Security University. This consolidated institution of professional education will 
educate officers and noncommissioned officers in professional values and a spirit 
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of service, pride and patriotism to transform their force for generations, since it 
will simultaneously educate multiple generations of Afghans across the force – from 
cadet to colonel and recruit to Sergeant Major. institutions like these are the key 
to making the Afghan national Security Force enduring. 
Creating Enduring Institutions
Since 2009, the focus has been on fielding trained infantry and police to meet 
the needs of counterinsurgency with additional combat fighting formations. While 
the combined force will continue to grow another 47,000 by October 2012, empha-
sis has shifted to specialty skills and vocational training. Lessons from other conflict-
-prone societies suggest that sustainment is essential to secure long -term gains and 
give a war -stricken society a chance to recover. Given the investment made over 
the last ten years and the priority of supporting Afghanistan’s stability, the inter-
national community and the Afghan government reaffirmed a long -term commitment 
to a better future for the Afghan people at the 2010 nATO summit in Lisbon. Spe-
cifically, nATO and Afghan leaders agreed to “Sustaining and improving their 
capacity and capability to counter threats to the security, stability and integrity of 
Afghanistan effectively, and contributing to regional security; and doing so with 
full respect for Afghan sovereignty and leadership, in a manner consistent with 
and supportive of the Afghan constitution and international law and recognizing 
the sacrifices and the ongoing endeavors of the Afghan people for achieving peace” 
(nATO, 2010). To realize these goals, army and police professionalization continues 
apace.
With the establishment of twelve specialty schools over the past year, nATO 
Training Mission -Afghanistan is now imparting skills and training units that will 
enable Afghan forces to perform critical combat service and combat service support 
functions themselves. This is part of a phased development effort that includes 
advanced training in logistics, finance, communications, human resources, intelli-
gence, artillery, engineering, and other important functions. As the fielding of 
these support units and specialists continues for the Army and Police, the force 
will be carefully and deliberately balanced with increased capability to give the 
ability to support and sustain itself, which will lead to independent operations. 
Advanced skills and professionalization are essential to fully transferring secu-
rity responsibility from nATO to Afghan forces. The critical pillar in the professio-
nalization strategy is to ensure there are enough certified Afghan trainers, who are 
beginning to take the training lead for recruits at numerous Army and Police 
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training centers. As of September 2011, there are over 3,000 Afghan instructors who 
are trained and certified in five satahs, or levels, of instruction, and represent the 
ability of Afghans to sustain an enduring training capacity. At Basic Warrior Trai-
ning, this has already happened; Afghans are training Afghans. The trend will 
continue through 2012 when Afghan trainers will lead all training efforts. At that 
point, coalition forces will provide oversight, assist in curriculum development, 
and ensure Afghans can run the training centers. Having an indigenous training 
base will give Afghanistan the ability to sustain its force over time.
At the same time army, air force, and police units are trained, equipped, fielded, 
and partnered, there is a substantial effort to develop sustainable systems and 
functioning ministries that can plan, program, budget, and execute ministerial 
goals. in support of this effort, there are about 500 nATO Training Mission-
-Afghanistan advisors who work at the Ministry of defense and the Ministry of 
interior. These advisors support their Afghan counterparts to ensure the necessary 
policies and systems are in place to implement strategic guidance from the President 
of Afghanistan and the ministers. This work includes everything from creating a 
modern personnel system that can identify, track, and manage personnel across the 
military and police to a comprehensive recruit screening process that vets, valida-
tes, and certifies Afghans’ eligibility for training. Additionally, as Afghanistan as-
sumes more programmatic authority over the next three years, providing budge-
tary oversight is important. in the current solar year of 1390, for example, the 
Minister of defense has direct budget authority for $900 million, while the Minister 
of interior directs $800 million. 
nATO -led international efforts to develop the Afghan military and police have 
produced progress. President Karzai’s Transition coordinator dr. Ashraf Ghani 
said, “The Afghan national army has had an enormous change both in quality and 
in numbers. For the seven locations which have been selected for tranche one, we 
are completely confident that the Afghan army will have the capability” (croft, 
2011). U.S. Major General daniel Allyn made a similar point, “A huge part of this 
[partnership] is demonstrating to the Afghan security forces that they’re as good 
as they are; in some cases they don’t realize how capable they have become in the 
last couple of years. So we are enabling them to take the lead and supporting them 
where they need to achieve success” (Ardolino, 2011). Most importantly, the Afghan 
people agree. in a november 2010 Asia Foundation poll, 92 percent of Afghans 
viewed the Afghan national Army favorably, while 84 percent viewed the police 
favorably. in a May international council on Security and development poll, 82 
percent of northern Afghans saw the army as effective compared to 67 percent of 
southern Afghans (Asia Foundation, 2011).
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There are regional differences, but with international support and training, 
Afghan soldiers and police are beginning to enforce the rule of law contributing to 
Afghan people increasingly trust and value put on their soldiers and police. This 
is evident in the thousands of Afghans who report to military and police recruiting 
stations every month, which is the surest sign that Afghans want to take charge of 
their future and relieve nATO forces of lead security responsibility. The challenge 
remains to make the gains enduring and the Afghan forces sustainable.
Essential Partnership
The progress made over the past two years would not have been possible wi-
thout the generous support of the international community through partnership. 
Before the creation of the nATO Training Mission -Afghanistan in november 2009 
there were insufficient resources – just two contributing countries and 30 interna-
tional trainers. This force was augmented by a substantial commitment of U.S. 
trainers and U.S. -funded contractors, but the mission lacked adequate resources 
and expertise. For example, since the United States does not have a national police 
force, it could provide little practical advice to the Ministry of interior or since the 
United States does not fly the Mi -17 helicopter, little help could be offered to assist 
the fledgling Afghan Air Force. 
in spite of the difficult start, nATO Training Mission -Afghanistan is truly an 
international command. Today, there are 37 countries providing about 1,800 trainers 
who are training both new recruits and Afghan trainers to take their places. now, 
it is italian carabineri, French and Romanian Gendarme, Spanish Guardia civil, 
Royal canadian Mounted Police, and other professional civilian police officers who 
train and advise the Afghan national Police, or in the case of the Air Force, it is 
trainers from the czech Republic, Hungary, and croatia who advise and assist the 
Afghan Mi -17 helicopter program. The depth of international partnership is proving 
nATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s idea that, “nATO can act as a matchmaker, 
bringing nations together to identify what they can do jointly at a lower cost, more 
efficiently, and with less risk” (Rasmussen, 2011).
countries increasingly recognize that training Afghanistan’s police and military 
is essential to long -term stability in Afghanistan and central Asia. Further, developing, 
employing, and sustaining the Afghan national Army, Air Force, and Police ensures 
Afghanistan can be a net contributor to international security rather than a consumer. 
With an indigenous training base, the government of Afghanistan will not be depen-
dent on foreign trainers and endeavors to become a regional hub for peacekeeping 
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training, pilot training, and vehicle maintenance. Just as we work with trainers from 
the formerly war -torn Balkan countries of croatia and Bosnia -Herzegovina, we can 
envision Afghanistan deploying peacekeepers or trainers in the future. 
countries increasingly recognize that training Afghanistan’s police and military 
is essential to long -term stability in Afghanistan and central Asia. Further, deve-
loping, employing, and sustaining the Afghan national Army, Air Force, and Poli-
ce ensures Afghanistan can be a net contributor to international security rather than 
a consumer. With an indigenous training base, the government of Afghanistan will 
not always be dependent on foreign trainers and endeavors to become a regional 
hub for peacekeeping training, pilot training, and vehicle maintenance. Just as we 
work with trainers from the formerly war -torn Balkan countries of croatia and 
Bosnia -Herzegovina, we can envision Afghanistan deploying peacekeepers or trai-
ners in the future to other conflict zones. 
Reflecting on ten years of United States involvement in Afghanistan, we recog-
nize the greatest long -term effect we can have is through partnership. Through 
iSAF, nearly a quarter of the world’s countries are working with the Afghan go-
vernment and the depth of the partnerships has grown over the last ten years. 
When it comes to Afghanistan, it appears a special relationship has emerged. 
While rocky over the last ten years, former Secretary of defense Gates signaled in 
early 2011 that the U.S. -Afghanistan relationship “is bonded in the blood of our 
sons and daughters” (daniel, 2011). Gates’ Afghan counterpart defense Minister 
Wardak said, “i strongly believe that our greatest tribute to them [coalition forces 
who were killed or wounded in Afghanistan] will be to realize the objectives of 
those brave soldiers who paid the ultimate price” (daniel, 2011). While Usama bin 
Laden brought the United States to Afghanistan, an enduring and self -sustaining 
Afghan national Security Force will preclude the use of Afghanistan as a base for 
terrorism in the future and is the greatest threat to the Taliban.
Implications for NATO’s Future
While nATO Training Mission -Afghanistan personnel are working hard to 
develop Afghan security forces, we are reflecting on the challenges, successes, and 
opportunities the mission created. Among these is the importance of international 
cooperation, which undergirds efforts in Afghanistan. This is apparent in listening 
to the different languages spoken from Kandahar to Kabul. international coopera-
tion is essential in Afghanistan today, but the experience must inform future thinking 
about the roles and missions of western militaries to embrace what nATO Secre-
tary General Rasmussen’s (2011) observation that, “The transatlantic partnership 
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remains the main engine of global security. The partnership has been successful in 
sharing common goals and values, while boasting interoperable and rapidly de-
ployable forces”.
With this in mind, western militaries appear to be at a new, albeit familiar 
crossroads. in the 1980s, the United States recognized the importance of joint ope-
rations and worked to improve cooperation among its Army, Air Force, navy, and 
Marine corps. in the 1990s, coalition warfare became the norm and interoperabili-
ty took on an international character. nATO was at the forefront of these efforts in 
the Balkans. in the 2000s, military operations began to incorporate interagency 
capabilities, which leveraged a whole of government approach to counterinsurgency 
and stability operations. in the 2010s, it is imperative we recognize security force 
assistance is a core function of military operations. nATO again is at the forefront 
of these efforts in Afghanistan. 
it is time for all nations in nATO to evaluate the shift from combat operations 
to training and work together to consider the implications for the size, shape, sco-
pe, and doctrine of their future forces as we move to sustainment operations in 
Afghanistan. Ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we must be ready to enable 
partners through security force assistance to eliminate security deficits that threaten 
international peace and security. As reaffirmed in nATO’s Strategic concept, “The 
Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership” 
(nATO, 2010a). To be fully prepared, we must reflect on the lessons of partnership 
in Afghanistan and ensure nATO has the appropriate strategy, training, and doc-
trine to enhance international security. 
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